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Abstract—The dynamic performance of the generators is a
critical factor for the safe operation of the power grid. To this
extent, the stability of the frequency of generators is the target
of cyber attacks since its instability may lead to sizable cascade
failures in the whole network. In this paper, we perform the
vulnerability analysis in a developed power grid Hardware-In-
The-Loop (HITL) testbed with a Wago 750-881 PLC sending con-
trol commands to the generators and a 750 Feeder Management
Relay connected to a local load. A process-aware coordinated
attack is demonstrated by spoofing control commands sent by
the PLC and the relay to the simulated power system which is
modeled as a single-machine infinite-bus (SMIB). Based on the
reachability analysis, the attacker can find the optimal attack
signal to drive the system state out of their safe set of values.
Thereafter, it is experimentally demonstrated that the attacker
does not need to send attack signal continuously if he implements
a carefully designed coordinated attack on the PLC and the
relay. The presented assessments provide information about the
best time to launch an attack in order to destabilize the power
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been several attacks on industrial control sys-
tems such as power grids, chemical processes, and water in-
frastructures in recent years [1]–[3]. Due to several economical
and technological factors, the integration of IT infrastructures
that support the timely exchange of data into the electrical
grids is growing fast. Also, today’s power electric systems are
equipped with different power storage technologies [4], [5]
that may lead to different security concerns. Consequently,
power grids dependency on Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) have made them vulnerable to various
types of cyber attacks. Development of reliable large power
systems requires profound understating about the potential
cyber attacks on IT infrastructures and their impacts on the
performance of the power systems.
There have been substantial works on different types of
attacks on SCADA system of power grids [6]–[10]. dif-
ferent detection and control methods including hybrid [11]
and continuous time [12] are utilized in power grids. In
false data injection (FDI) attacks, the attacker manipulates
the data generated by the SCADA system to deteriorate the
performance of state estimation unit. In [7], the problem of
cyber security of the state estimator in SCADA system is
investigated and the paper proposes two metrics to quantify
the impacts of possible attacks on the different level of model
uncertainties. [6] introduces the strong attack regime concept
and examines the most damaging attack as the adversary has
control over several meter measurements. A novel defense
strategy based on applying known perturbation on power grid
topology is considered in [13], and the optimal attack and
defense strategies are modeled as a zero-sum game. [14]
considers the effect of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on
communication infrastructures of smart grids, and shows the
dynamic performance of load frequency control for a two-
area power system in presence of attacks. In [15], the load
redistribution (LR) attacks as a special type of FDI attacks is
introduced, and the impacts of the LR attack on the system
performance is analyzed through a game theoretic approach.
[16] proposes a coordinated optimal cyber attack and analyzes
the most damaging attack for the attacker with limited sources.
Moreover, Multiple approaches have been considered to
assess the vulnerability of power grids to typical types of
attacks [17]–[21]. [17] analyzes the possible vulnerabilities
of transmission lines of power networks against possible
attacks while the interaction between the attacker and the
defender is captured as a zero-sum stochastic game. In [22], a
framework is proposed to examine vulnerabilities of different
power system topologies to FDI attacks and replay attacks.
Thereafter, the attacks identification problem is modeled as
an unknown input observer design problem. In [18], a layered
approach is proposed to assess the risk of dependency of cyber
security infrastructures and stability of the power systems.
Reachability analysis is an effective tool for the verification
and the assessment of hybrid systems [23]–[27]. [24] proposes
a zero-sum two players game model to assess the aircraft
collision avoidance problem and solves the game numerically
by leveraging level set methods. In [25], a numerical method is
proposed to compute the stability region of the power systems
and the numerical results are utilized to design the controller
for the transient stability of the power systems. [27] shows
that the reachability problem can be formulated as an optimal
control problem, and establishes links between reachability,
viability, and invariance problems with the solution to a
particular Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
In this paper, an integrated time-synchronized HITL simu-
lator with a PLC and a relay is developed. Motivated by [27]
and utilizing level set toolbox [28], we perform a reachability
analysis for the SMIB model connected to the PLC and the
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relay to obtain deep understanding about the robustness of
the power systems with respect to coordinated process-aware
attacks on the physical hardware. The effects of the attack on
PLC and relay on the power system performance and stability
are experimentally demonstrated, and the optimal attack policy
to deteriorate stability of the system is obtained through the
reachability analysis. In summary, the main contribution of
this paper is threefold:
• Development of an integrated time-synchronized HITL
simulator for a SMIB connected to a PLC and a relay for
studying security related risks.
• Experimental demonstration of the effect of PLC and re-
lay vulnerabilities on the SMIB performance and stability.
• Development of a systematic approach to assess the
robustness of the system to different levels of an attack
signal.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the
reachability analysis preliminaries and the mathematical model
of SMIB are explained. The structure of the HITL testbed is
presented in Section III. In Section IV, the simulation results
related to the stability region computation and the system
performance under attacks are demonstrated. The impact of the
attacks on hardware components of the testbed is illustrated
in Section V. In the last section, final remarks and conclusion
are presented.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Reachability analysis is an effective tool to examine the vul-
nerabilities of the power systems whose behaviors are modeled
as hybrid mathematical models. The mathematical model of
SMIB has been utilized to determine the impact of possible
cyber attacks on transient stability of the power systems. The
linear swing equation given in (1) is the mathematical model
of SMIB shown in figure 1.
δ˙ = ω
Mω˙ = Pm −Dω − PE sin(δ)− PL + d (1)
where δ is the generator rotor angle, ω is the rotor angular
velocity deviation, M is the inertia of the rotor, D is the
damping coefficient, Pm is the mechanical power input, PL is
the local load connected to the system, PE is the maximum
transfered electrical power, and d is the external disturbance
or the attack signal.
The transient stability of the power system frequency is a
vital part of the stability of the whole network. Instability of
the frequency of SMIB can jeopardize the stability of the
whole network and damage the power devices. Therefore,
the generator rotor angle and the rotor frequency deviation
should be limited to satisfy the safety constraints. The SMIB
is considered safe if its variables δ and ω satisfy the given
inequalities as follows:
−pi
2
≤ δ − δn ≤ pi
2
−6 ≤ ω − ωn ≤ 6 (2)
Figure 1. Schematics of SMBI model.
where δn and ωn denote the nominal generator rotor angle and
the nominal rotor frequency deviation.
Reachability analysis is a powerful numerical tool that
provides us with effective information about how long it will
take for the system to leave the safe region under a bounded
attack signal, what is the stability region of the system, and
how much the safe set changes after a specific amount of the
time. In our Hardware in the loop simulator, the PLC sends
control signals to the actuators, e.g., generation set-points to
the generator that mandate how much power the generator
should generate and a relay is used to control the connection
of the local load PL to the SMIB model defined in (1). Also,
the system dynamics is simulated by the Matlab software.
The SMIB dynamics can be written as a continuous non-
linear system x˙ = f(x, d) with x ∈ R2 and d ∈ D ⊂ R.
It is assumed that D ⊂ R is compact and f(.) is bounded
and Lipschitz continuous. Moreover, for any T ≥ 0, x ∈ R2,
t ∈ [0, T ], and d ∈ D, the system 1 admits a unique solution
φ(., t.x, d) and φ(t, t.x.d) = x.
Given (1), we would like to characterize the relation be-
tween the set of states S ∈ R2 and state trajectory of the
SMIB over time horizon [t, T ], T ≥ t. The main goal is to
answer the following questions by leveraging the reachability
analysis: (i) what is the set of the initial conditions that will
converge to the stable equilibrium of the system? (ii) what is
the set of the initial conditions that the system does not leave
the safe set for any attack signal d ∈ D? (iii) what is the set
of initial conditions that there exists at least one attack signal
d ∈ D to keep the system in a predefined set? To answer these
questions, the following sets should be computed:
Reach(t, S) = {x ∈ R2|∃d(.) ∈ D,∃τ ∈ [t, T ],
φ(τ, t, x, d(.)) ∈ S}
Inv(t, S) = {x ∈ R2|∀d(.) ∈ D,∀τ ∈ [t, T ],
φ(τ, t, x, d(.)) ∈ S}
V iab(t, S) = {x ∈ R2|∃d(.) ∈ D,∀τ ∈ [t, T ],
φ(τ, t, x, d(.)) ∈ S}
Given the set S = {x ∈ R2|l(x) ≥ 0}, where l(x) is
the sign distance to the set S, Inv(t, S) and V iab(t, S) are
computed as follows [27]: Inv(t, S) = {x ∈ R2|V1(x, t) ≥
0}, where the value function V1(x, t) is given as V1(x, t) =
infd(.)∈Dminτ∈[t,T ] l(φ(τ, t, x, d(.))). Moreover, V1(x, t) is
the solution of the terminal value problem.
∂V1
∂t
(x, t) + min{0, inf
d(.)∈D
∂V1
∂x
(x, t)f(x, d)} (3)
with terminal condition V1(x, T ) = l(x). Similar to invariant
set computation, V iab(t, S) = {x ∈ R2|V2(x, t) ≥ 0},
where the value function V2(x, t) is given as V2(x, t) =
supd(.)∈Dminτ∈[t,T ] l(φ(τ, t, x, d(.))). Moreover, V2(x, t) is
the solution of the terminal value problem.
∂V2
∂t
(x, t) + min{0, sup
d(.)∈D
∂V2
∂x
(x, t)f(x, d)} (4)
with terminal condition V2(x, T ) = l(x).
given the definition of Reach(t, S) and Inv(t, S), it is clear
that Reach(t, S) = (Inv(t, Sc))c. Therefore, it is not needed
to compute Reach(t, S) separately.
If the nonlinear system x˙ = f(x, d) can be written as:
x˙ = fx(x) + fd(x)d (5)
Then, the optimal input for the equations (3) and (4) can be
derived for invariant set and viability set respectively as:
d∗1 =
{
dh if
∂V1
∂x (x, t)fd(x) ≤ 0,
dl otherwise
(6)
,
d∗2 =
{
dl if
∂V2
∂x (x, t)fd(x) ≤ 0,
dh otherwise
(7)
where dl and dh are lower and upper limits of the signal d,
d∗1 is the optimal input seeking to keep the system state out
of the safe set and d∗2 is the optimal input seeking to keep the
system state in safe set.
III. EXPERIMENTAL HITL TESTBED
Software models cannot accurately recreate real-world con-
ditions and introduce simplifying assumptions regarding the
model by design thus not fulfilling the important requirement
of a testbed of adequately representing the behavior of the
actual physical system. With a HITL testbed, real hardware is
combined with a simulation model contributing to a symbiotic
relationship between virtual and physical components of the
modeled process.
An experimental testbed (depicted in Figure 2) has been set
up to emulate the operation of the SMIB process. To facilitate
this, a Simulink model of the SMIB (run on a PC) has been
modified to accommodate a HITL mode of operation wherein
a PLC is used sending generation set-point commands to the
generator and a protection relay hardware is used controlling
the connection of the local load PL to the SMIB dynamics
given in (1).
The PLC we have chosen for the HITL testbed, as discussed
above, is the Wago 750-881 Ethernet Programmable Fieldbus
Controller. The Wago PLC features a 32-bit ARM CPU with
multitasking capabilities and a real-time clock and runs a
Figure 2. HITL testbed including SMBI simulator, Wago PLC, and Relay.
Real-Time Operating System (RTOS). The 32KB non-volatile
memory hosts configuration files for the PLC, HTML pages,
as well as the ladder logic files that get loaded during boot
time. Also, the relay is a 750 Feeder Protection Relay, a
member of the SR Family of protection relays, is a digital
relay for primary protection of transmission lines, feeders, and
transformers.
Two serial-interface boards (SIBs), with analog-to-digital
(A/D) and digital-to-analog (D/A) conversion capabilities and
level-shifting circuitry, serves as the interface between the
PLC and the relay with the Simulink host PC. Simulinks
serial interface functionality is used to communicate with the
SIBs. Packets containing values corresponding to the power
generation set-point of the generator are sent from PLC to the
SIB over a custom built USB-Serial connection [29]. Also, the
relay open/closed commands are sent from/to PC through the
SIB over a USB-Serial connection. The HITL setup includes:
• Host PC running SMIB model.
• Serial interface boards (SIBs) and level-shifting (op-amp)
array.
• Wago PLC unit.
• Relay unit.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the reachability concept is utilized to answer
some security concerns about the SMIB transient stability.
First, it is assumed that the attacker only has access to the
relay connected to the local load in Figure 1. The objec-
tive is to find the stability region of the system when the
relay is open/closed. For the system defined in (1), given
M = 0.026 s
2
rad , D = 0.12, Pm = 1 p.u, PG = 1.35 p.u,
and PL = 0.4 p.u, the stability region is computed based on
the definition of Reach(t, S), given the target set as a small
ball around the stable equilibrium point for the case relay is
open/closed. Figures 3 and 4 show evolution of the stability
region after 1.5 and 3 seconds respectively. After t = 3(s),
the stability region does not change. So, the Points inside the
boundaries in Figure 4 determine the set of initial conditions
that the system will enter target set during τ ∈ [0, 3]. The
attacker can shrink the stability region of the system by taking
control of the relay. Given the initial conditions [−0.5, 13]T ,
figure 5 demonstrates the system trajectory with different relay
statuses. These initial conditions are out of stability region for
the case relay is open. Therefore, the states do not return to
stable equilibrium as shown in figure 5.
Figure 3. Stability region after 1.5 second.
Figure 4. Stability region after 3 seconds.
Next, we would like to find the minimum attack signal that
keeps the system state from entering the safe set defined in
(2). Given the definition of the invariant set, if x ∈ Inv(0, S)
the system will never leave the safe set over interval [0, T ]. We
would like to find the set of initial starting points which system
state trajectories do not leave the safe set for any attacks policy
with a bounded attack signals. it is assumed that the PLC sends
a set of control commands to the actuators, e.g., generation
set-point to the generator that specifies how much power the
Figure 5. Transient response of the system state under different relay statuses.
Figure 6. Safe set at t=0.
generator should generate. Therefore, the attacker can add an
arbitrary signal d to the system dynamics by spoofing the
PLC control commands to the generator. Figures 6 to 8 show
evolution of the invariant set as time goes when the attacker
can inject any arbitrary signal |d| ≤ 0.2. After t = 3(s), the
invariant set does not change. Consequently, the intersection
of the invariant sets for the relay open/closed status under PLC
attack at t = 3(s) builds the set of resilient initial points for
coordinated attack on relay and PLC. It means that the system
will not leave the safe set under any switching policy on relay
connected to PL and any attack signal |d| ≤ 0.2.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For the HITL testbed, the Wago PLC generates the attack
signal for Simulink model of the SBIM system. Given (6), the
optimal attack input generated by PLC to keep the system out
Figure 7. Invariant set after 1.5 second.
Figure 8. Invariant set after 3 second.
of the safe set is shown in figure 9, and figure 10 represents the
state trajectories corresponding to this attack signal. The initial
conditions for trajectories shown in figure 10 are [1.2, 6]T . The
point [1.2, 6]T is outside the invariant set related to relay open
status and inside the invariant set related to relay closed status
as shown in figures 7 and 8. Consequently, the state trajectory
will go outside of the safe set under the optimal attack signal
when the relay is open while state trajectory will not leave the
safe set even under the optimal attack signal when the relay is
closed. These experimental results show that the coordinated
Figure 9. PLC optimal attack signal.
Figure 10. System state trajectories under the attack signal |d| ≤ 0.2.
attack on PLC and relay gives more flexibility to the attacker
to deteriorate system performance.
By performing a series of invariant set computation for
different attack signal bounds, it is concluded that the invariant
set is empty under attack signal |d| ≥ 0.4 and |d| ≥ 0.6 as
the relay is open and closed respectively. Empty invariant set
means that there is at least one attack signal that can drive the
system state out of the safe set and this attack signal can be
generated based on (6).
The attacker does not need to inject an attack signal contin-
uously in order to make the system unstable. Figure 11 shows
the coordinated attack on PLC and relay. The attacker applies
the attack signal till t = 1.93s to keep the system state out of
stability region computed in figure 4 and after that, he does
not apply any signal through PLC and he just makes the relay
open to destabilize the system state. As shown in figure 11,
note that the system states return to the stability point if the
relay remains closed.
VI. CONCLUSION
An integrated time-synchronized HITL simulator for the
SMBI power system has been developed for experimental
demonstration of the effects of the coordinated attacks on the
Figure 11. System state trajectories under the coordinated attack.
PLC and the relay. It has shown that the attacker can carefully
design his attack policy based on reachability analysis on the
power system in order to destabilize the generator frequency.
Based on the computation of the reachability set, the attacker
obtains information about the set of initial conditions that the
system states converge to the stable equilibrium. By applying
a coordinated attack on the PLC and the relay, the attacker can
destabilize the system frequency in a shorter time with respect
to the case that the attacker has only control over the PLC
commands. Also, the robustness of the systems with respect
to the different level of the attack signals was analyzed by
leveraging the reachability tools.
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